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THE MENTALLY RETARDED AND PRIVATE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
THOMAS F.

GUERNSEY*

I. INTRODUCTION

Recent years have evidenced a growing deinstitutionalization of
a wide variety of people, including the mentally retarded.1 As a
result of this movement, mental health officials are attempting to
place the mentally retarded in the least restrictive environment.2
Local zoning ordinances, however, often have hindered their efforts.' In an effort to overcome these obstacles, twenty-two states
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.A. 1973, University of Michigan;
J.D. 1976, Wayne State University; L.L.M. 1980, Temple University.
The author wishes to thank Diane Trifari for her research assistance and William A.
Kare for his valuable comments.
1. E.g., E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961); Bazelon, Institutionalization,Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 897 (1975) (addressing the criminally
insane); Boyd, Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements for Retarded
Citizens: Parens PatriaeMeets Police Power, 25 VILL. L. REv. 273 (1980); Marx, Test &
Stein, Extrohospital Management of Severe Mental Illness: Feasibilityand Effects of Social Functioning,29 ARCHIVES GEN. PsYcHIATRY 505 (1973); Stein, Test & Marx, Alternative
to the Hospital: A Controlled Study, 132 AM. J. PSYcHIATRY 517 (1975); Note, Zoning for
the Mentally Ill: A Legislative Mandate, 16 HARv. J. LEGIS. 853, 855 (1979).
2. Glenn, The Least Restrictive Alternative in Residential Care and the Principle of
Normalization, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMrrrEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 499 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE].
See generally infra note 5.
3. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 1, at 273; Chandler & Ross, Zoning Restrictions and the
Right to Live in the Community, in PRESIDENT'S CoMMrrrEE, supra note 2, at 305; Lippencott, A Sanctuary for People: Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes for Retarded Persons,31 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1979); Special Report, Disabled
Citizens In the Community: Zoning Obstacles and Legal Remedies, AMicus, Mar.-Apr.
1978, at 29; Note, Group Homes and Deinstitutionalizaton:The Legislative Response to
Exclusionary Zoning, 6 VT. L. REv. 509 (1981); Note, A Review of the Conflict Between
Community-Based Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded and Restrictive Zoning, 82 W.
VA. L. REv. 669 (1980); Comment, Zoning the Mentally Retarded Into Single-Family Residential Areas: A Grape of Wrath or the Fermentationof Wisdom, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 385
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Zoning]; Comment, Exclusion of Community Facilitiesfor
Offenders and Mentally Disabled Persons:Questions of Zoning, Home Rule, Nuisance, and
ConstitutionalLaw, 25 DE PAuL L. REV. 918 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Exclusion]; Comment, Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Retarded in Maine: The Inevitable
Face-off with Zoning, 35 ME. L. REv. 33 (1983); Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Its
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have enacted statutes permitting the placement of group homes for
the mentally retarded in single-family residential neighborhoods.4
Although these statutes have provided some benefit to the mentally retarded, 5 the statutes are of limited value if private individuals can continue to block the deinstitutionalization of the mentally
retarded through the use of restrictive covenants.
This Article provides an analytical framework for a court's analysis of covenants restricting group homes. Parts II and III of the
Article indicate that ordinary rules of statutory interpretation allow private individuals effectively to exclude group homes. Part IV
discusses whether a state, in its exercise of eminent domain, must
compensate surrounding landowners when the state takes property
subject to a private restrictive covenant in order to establish a
group home. The Article then discusses the constitutionality of restrictive covenants, the circumstances under which public policy
may prevent enforcement of restrictive covenants, and whether
states may enact statutes to limit the scope of restrictive
covenants.

Effects on Group Homes In Areas Zoned for Single-Family Dwellings, 24 U.
677 (1976).

KAN.

L.

REV.

4. For a complete list of these statutes, see Comment, Can the Mentally Retarded Enjoy
"Yards That Are Wide?," 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1349, 1357 n.60 (1982).
5. For a discussion of the various benefits that the residents of group homes receive, see
Bachrach, A Note on Some Recent Studies of Released Mental Hospital Patients in the
Community, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 73 (1976); Linn, Caffey, Klett & Hogarty, Hospital vs.
Community (Foster)Care for PsychiatricPatients,34 ARCHIVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 78 (1977);
Rog & Raush, The Psychiatric Halfway House: How Is It Measuring Up?, 11 COMMUNITY
MErAL HEALTH J. 155 (1975); Sorgen, Labeling and Classification,in PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 214.
Although the material discussed in this Article is relevant to many different types of
group homes, the Article focuses only on those group homes that house the mentally retarded. The validity of a restrictive covenant affecting a group home will vary depending
upon the population housed in the home. Of the various populations housed in group
homes, the mentally retarded are most conducive to placement in traditional single-family
neighborhoods. Unlike the residents of some group homes, the mentally retarded differ from
the general population only in their cognitive and adaptive development and are no more
dangerous to themselves or to others than are other members of the general population. See
PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE, supra note 2, at xxv-xxix.
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A. General Validity of Restrictive Covenants
Both the courts of law6 and the courts of equity7 long have recognized the restrictive covenant as a legitimate means of regulating
land use." With a restrictive covenant, a landowner can control the
manner in which subsequent purchasers may use the property. Because the covenant runs with the land,' the burdens or benefits of
the covenant are enforceable against subsequent purchasers, 10 absent a statute to the contrary." An estate, therefore, can be encumbered forever by a restrictive covenant. 2 Nonetheless, restric13
tive covenants continue to enjoy the relative favor of the courts.
The only significant limitations that the courts impose upon restrictive covenants are that the covenants run with the land1 4 and
6. See Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (K.B. 1583).
7. See Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (Ch. 1848).
8. Private restrictive covenants are a primary method of regulating residential land use
today. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 349, 360 (2d ed. 1975).
9. "The running of the covenant with the land means that the burdens or benefits, or
both, of the covenant, pass to the persons who succeed to the estate of the original contracting parties." R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 516 (3d ed. 1981).
10. The rule against perpetuities does not apply to restrictive covenants. A restrictive
covenant, therefore, provides a more effective means of regulating land use than do most
future interests. Because the rule against perpetuities also does not apply to defeasible fees
other than executory interests, see T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 209 (1966), land owners often restricted the use of their land through
the use of defeasible fees before the development of modem restrictive covenants. J.
DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 969 (1981). Modem courts tend to favor restrictive covenants rather than defeasible fees. J. CRBmBET, supra note 8, at 215, 348.
11. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-60 (1982) (limiting duration of restrictive covenants
generally to 20 years).
12. A covenant running in equity may be extinguished under the following circumstances:
(a) the subsequent owner performs an act that violates the servitude and continues to do so
for the period of the statute of limitations; (b) the dominant tenant executes a release; or (c)
conditions exist which make the purpose and object of the servitude impossible to achieve.
R. BOYER, supra note 9, at 542.
13. See J. CRIBET, supra note 8, at 360; Stoebuck & Williams, Running Covenants: An
Analytical Primer,52 WASH. L. REV. 861, 886 (1977) ("restrictive covenants are now judicial
favorites"). But see R. BoYER, supra note 9, at 517 ("Because a covenant running with the
land encumbers the land and fetters its free alienability there is a tendency to restrict
rather than expand the legal effect of the covenant. The 'running' is disfavored rather than
favored.").
14. A restrictive covenant can run at law-and thus bind subsequent purchasers of the
property-if the following requirements are met: (1) the covenant must be in writing; (2) the
original parties to the covenant must have intended that it run with the land; (3) the successors to the property must have had notice of the covenant; (4) the covenant must touch and
concern the land; and (5) privity of estate must exist. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRiER, supra note

WILLIAM AND

MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:421

that they do not violate public policy.15 Because the courts continue to uphold restrictive covenants, litigation rarely involves a
covenant's validity. Instead, litigation primarily involves the interpretation of the covenant.
B. Concerns of the Respective Parties
Recognizing that restrictive covenants are a valid means of regulating land use, the question becomes whether the public's interest
in the deinstitutionalization of the mentally retarded should override such regulation. To answer that question, one must consider
the interests of the property owner, as well as the interests of the
mentally retarded. A natural tendency is to dismiss the objecting
landowner as a person seeking to isolate himself from modern realities. 16 Although some landowners undoubtedly have selfish motives for excluding the mentally retarded, others have voiced plausible reasons for their opposition.1 7 The most often expressed
concern of property owners is that the presence of a group home
for the mentally retarded would alter dramatically the underlying
character of the owners' neighborhood. More specifically, property
owners contend that a group home would produce increased noise
and traffic, decreased safety, and a devaluation of property. 8 Property owners also argue that they should not have to bear individually a cost that society should bear collectively.1 9 Finally, they
maintain that the proponents of group homes have misconstrued
the issue: "If we are asked to choose between well-run residential
facilities and poor custodial institutions for the mentally retarded,
the choice is simple. On the other hand, if we are asked to choose
between well-run residential facilities and high-quality institutions,

10, at 1025. See generally Stoebuck & Williams, supra note 13. A party seeking enforcement

of a restrictive covenant in a court of equity must establish only the first four elements. J.
DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 10, at 1032.

15. See infra notes 167-99 and accompanying text.
16. E.g., Boyd, supra note 1, at 277; Lippencott, supra note 3, at 769; Comment, supra

note 4, at 1366.
17. E.g., Deutch, Reaction Comment, in PREsIDENr's COMMIrrEE, supra note 2, at 343.
18. Lippencott, supra note 3, at 769 (citing D. LAUBER & F. BANGS, ZONING FOR FAMILY
AND

GROUP CARE

FACLITmIS

8-10 (Am. Soc'y of Planning Officials Planning Advisory Serv.

Rep. No. 300, 1974)).
19. Deutch, supra note 17, at 347.
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the problem is more difficult."20
In contrast, the proponents of group homes 21 have contended
that the institutionalization of the mentally retarded is a costly exercise involving the isolation of people in human warehouses.22 In
addition to finding that the institutionalization of the mentally retarded is morally reprehensible, proponents also have asserted that
institutionalization is both costly and counterproductive: "Many
retarded people behave in a socially unacceptable manner and fail
to reach their intellectual potential precisely because they are isolated from society and are not expected to develop. ' 23 The proponents maintain that group homes would normalize the living environment, and thereby facilitate the development of the mentally
retarded.24
On balance, research indicates that the expressed concerns of
landowners opposed to the development of group homes for the
mentally retarded are unjustified.2 5 These concerns presumably reflect a fear of the unknown and a desire to avoid those who are
different. 26 Despite the fallacy of these concerns, however, landowners remain committed to their position. As a result, the debate
over group homes has been heated and occasionally violent, 27 with
both sides accusing each other of narrowmindedness. 2 Aside from
the personal feelings that are involved, the debate is difficult to
resolve because intertwined within the debate are traditional and
often technical contract and property rules, constitutional questions concerning the proper role and power of the courts, and serious questions of public policy. Few courts, however, have addressed adequately all of these various aspects of the debate.
20. Id. at 345.
21.
22.
23.
24.

E.g., supra notes 1 & 3.
Lippencott, supra note 3, at 768.
Id.
Id. at 768-69.

25. Id. See also infra note 197.
26. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1358.
27. See Toperoff, It Happened In One of the Best Neighborhoods, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19,
1978, at 26, col. 2 (fire officials suspected arson in a fire which destroyed a group home for
the mentally retarded).
28. One opponent of group homes has observed that "[a]dvocates of programs for the
mentally retarded, because they often have personal involvement, are frequently so immersed in their own point of view and the feeling that their cause is just that they do not
see any merit in legitimate criticism." Deutch, supra note 17, at 344.
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II.

INTERPRETATION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS:

A

QUESTION OF

INTENT

Because courts traditionally view restrictive covenants as contracts,29 the parties' intent normally controls interpretation of the
covenant.3 0 A primary indication of the parties' intent is the pre-

cise language of the restrictive covenant. A court will consider the
language of the covenant, therefore, in attempting to ascertain the
restrictions imposed upon the property. In construing the language
of the covenant, a court will consider whether the covenant's restrictions apply to the use of the building or to the nature of the

physical structure. 31 A court also will seek to determine the meaning of such words as "family" and "single-family." 32 After discovering the intent of the parties, the court must determine whether
public policy allows the court to enforce that intent. 33
A. Structure Versus Use In Restrictive Covenants

A covenant can restrict the use of the property or the nature of
the physical structures placed upon the property. In Shaver v.

29. See generally Comment, Validity Rules ConcerningPublic Zoning and Private Covenants: A Comparison and Critique, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 409, 412 (1966).
30. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 554 (1944).
31. E.g., Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
377 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1982); Seaton
v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972); City of Livonia v. Department of
Social Servs., 119 Mich. App. 806, 328 N.W.2d 1 (1982); Leland Acres Home Owners Ass'n v.
R.T. Partnership, 106 Mich. App. 790, 308 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Malcolm v. Shamie, 95 Mich.
App. 132, 290 N.W.2d 101 (1980); Jayno Heights Landowners Ass'n v. Preston, 85 Mich.
App. 443, 271 N.W.2d 268 (1978) (single-family unit); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential
Sys., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978) (single-family residence); Costley v.
Caromin House, 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981); State ex rel. Region II Child & Family Servs.
v. District Court, 609 P.2d 245 (Mont. 1980); Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993
(1976); J.T. Hobby & Son v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981); Shaver v.
Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 377 (1982); Crowley v.
Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980); see also Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v.
Paulist Fathers, 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847 (1943) (priests wishing to live in an area
restricted by a covenant to single-family dwellings); Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113
Mich. App. 322, 317 N.W.2d 611 (1982) (day care center in an area limited by a restrictive
covenant to residential purposes); Cash v. Catholic Diocese, 414 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967) (nuns wishing to live in an area restricted by a covenant to single-family dwellings).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 167-99.
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3 4
Hunter,
the Texas Court of Appeals determined that the parties
had intended to restrict the use of the property, rather than the
type of structure. 5 In Shaver, a covenant restricted property to
residential purposes and specified that a "residence shall be construed to be a single family dwelling."' 6 Based upon this language,
the court concluded that the defendant had violated the covenant
by allowing his home to be used by a nonprofit corporation as a
shelter for severely handicapped individuals. The court, therefore,
granted the injunction sought by the plaintiff. As Shaver reveals, a
restrictive covenant limiting the use of property to a single-family
dwelling can prohibit any use of the property as a group home.
In contrast, a restrictive covenant limiting the type of structure
that can be placed upon the property has no effect on the property's use. Thus, as the New Jersey Supreme Court observed in
Berger v. State,3 7 such a covenant does not prohibit use of the
property as a group home. In Berger, the court construed a restrictive covenant which provided that "no building of any kind shall
be erected or permitted.., excepting a dwelling house." 38 Holding
that the defendant had not violated the covenant by allowing the
house to be used as a home for handicapped preschool children,
the court asserted that such covenants "must be strictly construed
[because t]he limitations and prohibitions they impose may be felt
over a very long period of time. It is not too much to insist that
they be carefully drafted to state exactly what is intended-no
more and no less."3 9

B. Judicial Interpretation of the Term "Family" in Restrictive
Covenants
A court's interpretation of the term "family" in a restrictive covenant often determines whether property can be used for a group

34. 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 377 (1982).
35. 626 S.W.2d at 576-77.
36. Id. at 576.
37. 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976). Accord Malcolm v. Shamie, 95 Mich. App. 132, 290
N.W.2d 101 (1980); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269
N.W.2d 673 (1978); J.T. Hobby & Son v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981).

38. 71 N.J. at
39. Id. at

-,

-,

364 A.2d at 996 n.1.
364 A.2d at 997.
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home.4 0 Rather than looking to the intent of the original parties,
however, courts more often determine the meaning of "family" on
the basis of public policy. In Bellarmine Hills Association v. Residential Systems,4 ' for example, the Michigan Court of Appeals
stated that "the word family denotes a concept, the application of
which is dependent upon the basis of affiliation of the group being
analyzed juxtaposed with the public policies invoked by the particular circumstances of the case being reviewed."4' 2
Although courts certainly should consider public policy when reviewing covenants,43 the courts should not attempt to use public
policy as the primary interpretive tool. Rather than defining the
term "family" on the basis of public policy, courts should apply
ordinary rules of contract interpretation and seek to discern the
true intention of the parties. If the intent is unclear, public policy
may be determinative. After interpreting the covenant in this manner, the court then can consider whether the covenant should be
invalidated on public policy grounds. 4
Often, courts misconstrue a restrictive covenant by simply
adopting the definition of "family" set forth in zoning cases.
Courts often cite City of White Plains v. Ferraioli45 when attempting to define "family" in a restrictive covenant. In City of White
Plains, the New York Court of Appeals held that a group home
which housed ten foster children constituted a family within the
meaning of a zoning ordinance. 46 The court reasoned that because
a "group home bears the generic character of a family unit as a
relatively permanent household, 4 7 the objectives of the ordinance
were met. Applying similar reasoning in a different case, the New
York Supreme Court held that a group home for the mentally re-

40. See generally supra note 32.
41. 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978).
269 N.W.2d at 675.
42. Id. at -,
43. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(f) (1932).
44. Under this approach, the court would not be interpreting the covenant, but rather
voiding it, on public policy grounds. Bellarmine Hills is an exception to most restrictive
covenant cases in that the court recognized the public policy considerations inherent in its
269 N.W.2d at 675.
basis of affiliation test. 84 Mich. App. at -,
45. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
46. Id. at 305-06, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53.
47. Id., 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
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48
tarded also came within the definition of a family.
Because of the inherent differences between a restrictive covenant and a zoning ordinance, the applicability of City of White
Plains to cases involving restrictive covenants is questionable. A
zoning ordinance's definition of family may differ significantly
from the meaning intended by two private individuals who enter
into a restrictive covenant. In enacting a zoning ordinance, a city
seeks to protect the interests of the entire population, whereas private individuals seek to further only their own interests through
the use of a restrictive covenant. Moreover, although a zoning ordinance has the limited purpose of protecting the character of the
neighborhood and promoting the family environment, 49 a restrictive covenant can promote a much wider range of goals, including
some that are not laudable.5 0 Indeed, individuals sometimes use restrictive covenants to advance goals that are repugnant to others in
the community.5 1 Courts generally will uphold restrictions on lot
size 52 and floor space, 53 although such restrictions often are intended not only to maintain the residential characteristics of the
neighborhood but also, as with zoning ordinances, to exclude cer54
tain persons.

48. Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 94
Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223, a/j'd, 60 A.D.2d 644, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1977). See
also Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90,
383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1976).
49. 34 N.Y.2d at 305, 313 N.E.2d at 757, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
50. See Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221, a/'d, 60 A.D.2d 644, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1977);
Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383
N.Y.S.2d 364 (1976).
51. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52. See, e.g., Jones v. Haines, Hodges & Jones Bldg. & Dev.Co., 371 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1963) (upholding a restriction against the building of residential structures on a lot
smaller than 20,000 square feet or less than 100 feet in width); Rydberg v. Jennings Beach
Ass'n, 69 A.D.2d 816, 414 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1979) (two acre minimum restriction upheld), a/I'd,
49 N.Y.2d 934, 406 N.E.2d 491, 428 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1980); see also Cadbury v. Bradshaw, 43
Or. App. 33, 602 P.2d 289 (1979) (no more than one dwelling on a parcel).
53. See, e.g., Barber v. Winter, 208 Ga. 712, 69 S.E.2d 249 (1952) (upholding a 1000
square foot minimum floor space restriction); Shipley v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 30 Ill.
App. 2d 335, 174 N.E.2d 216 (1961) (upholding a minimum floor space requirement).
54. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the validity of a zoning ordinance which limited the number of unrelated
people who could live together. The ordinance provided that "'[a] number of persons but
not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:421

If a court does base its decision on public policy grounds, zoning
cases are relevant in defining "family." Zoning statutes and ordinances presumably reflect public policy, but few courts5" identify
the limited connection between public policy and the definition of
"family."5 6 Although the definition of "family" set forth in zoning
decisions should not supplant the parties' intent, courts can consider this definition if the parties' intent is unclear.
Courts have recognized that the term "family" can encompass
58
57
more than the traditional nuclear family. In an early decision,
for example, the Michigan Supreme Court observed that
"'[m]ember of family' may have various meanings under different
circumstances."59 Rejecting the plaintiff's contention that a family
member must be related by blood or marriage, the court reasoned
that, because such a definition necessarily would exclude servants
from living in the house, the covenanting parties could not have
intended such a narrow definition. Applying similar reasoning,
modern courts have held that a family may consist of individuals
related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.'" Id. at 2.
The Village of Belle Terre was less than one square mile in size and contained 220 homes.
The Court probably would not uphold a similar ordinance in a city the size of New York in
the absence of other appropriate areas in which to live. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980) (limit of five persons did not
achieve effectively the desired goals); see also Gabe Collins Realty v. City of Margate City,
112 N.J. Super. 341, -,
271 A.2d 430, 434 (1970) (pre-Belle Terre limitation of two unrelated persons held invalid).
55. But cf. Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1982); McMillan
v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559 (1982); Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113
Mich. App. 322, 317 N.W.2d 611 (1982); Jayno Heights Landowners Ass'n v. Preston, 85
Mich. App. 443, 271 N.W.2d 268 (1978); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys., 84 Mich.
App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Costley v. Caromin House, 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981).
56. Such a failure, of course, is not unique to the interpretation of restrictive covenants.
Courts often use interpretation as a guise for implementing public policy. J. CALAMAM & J.
PERiLLO, CoNTRACTs 126 (2d ed. 1977). For an extended discussion of this problem in the
context of restrictive covenants, see Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77
MICH. L. REv. 12, 32-44 (1978).
57. Courts long have applied a general definition of "family" in the context of such residential uses as boarding rooms, fraternities, group religious homes, duplexes, and condominiums. See generallyAnnot., 99 A.L.R.3d 985 (1980). Courts also have applied a general definition of "family" in cases involving restrictive covenants. Only recently, however, have
courts confronted the definition of "family" in the context of group homes for the mentally
retarded.
58. Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers, 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847
(1943).
59. Id. at 259, 10 N.W.2d at 849.
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who are not related by either blood or marriage.60 The emerging
judicial trend is to define a family as "a group of people who live,
sleep, cook and eat upon the premises as a single house-keeping
unit."' 61 In reaching this definition of family, the zoning cases obviously influenced judicial thinking,6 2 as demonstrated by the striking similarity between this definition and the definition set forth in
City of White Plains.6 3
Although a general definition of "family" that could be applied
uniformly to all cases has some initial appeal, the courts should
rely on such a definition only if the parties' intent is unclear. If,
however, the courts can determine the definition that the parties
themselves intended to apply, that definition should be controlling
under the traditional standards of contract interpretation.
C. Interpreting "Family" Under the
Construction

Traditional Rules

of

The court's first step when attempting to interpret the language
of any covenant is to define the applicable standard of interpretation.6 4 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts the position 5 advocated by Professor Corbin,6 e who maintains that a court
should interpret a contract on the basis of the parties' actual understanding of the agreement,6 7 rather than upon the basis of a
reasonable man standard.6 8 To facilitate the court's determination
of the parties' perception of the agreement, the first Restatement
offers several rules of construction.6 Despite the useful guidance
that these rules provide," ° few courts refer to them when interpret60. See, e.g., Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 42, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980).
61. Id. at -,
288 N.W.2d at 823 (citing Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 2d 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954)).
62. The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon a zoning decision in reaching the definition
of "family" set forth in Crowley. See 94 Wis. 2d at -,
288 N.W.2d at 823.
63. See 34 N.Y.2d at 304, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
64. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 56, at 116-17.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21A (1979).
66. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 56, at 121.
67. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 542 (1960).
68. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 56, at 118.
69. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 235-236 (1932).
70. Courts, of course, cannot apply all of the rules suggested by the Restatement when
interpreting the term "family" in a restrictive covenant. Under the Restatement's first rule,
for example, courts are to apply the ordinary meaning of words when interpreting the con-
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ing restrictive covenants, other than to note that a court must con71
strue the language of any covenant strictly.
A rule of construction that often could aid courts in interpreting
a restrictive covenant is that a writing should be interpreted as a
whole. 7 2 J.T. Hobby & Son v. Family Homes73 illustrates the significance of this rule. In J.T. Hobby, a restrictive covenant limited
the property to "one attached single-family dwelling. 1 4 The covenant, however, also limited the property to "residential purposes. ' 75 Construing the covenant as a whole, the North Carolina
Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had not violated the
covenant by using the house as a group home. Maintaining that
the two phrases must have separate meanings,7 6 the court held that
the first phrase referred to the manner in which the property was
to be used, whereas the latter phrase, which was not restricted in
any way, indicated that use of the property by more than one family was acceptable. 1
Courts often must ascertain an intent that did not exist at the
time of the agreement because the parties who have drafted a restrictive covenant frequently have ignored the possibility that the
property might be used for a group home. Courts, therefore, need
to consider all of the surrounding circumstances when interpreting
a covenant. Courts also may need to examine the subsequent actions of the parties to determine the type of restrictions that the

tract. See id. § 235(a). The problem with this rule is that some words, such as "family,"
have a variety of meanings, and the court may apply a more narrow definition of the word
than the parties intended. For example, courts that have construed the term "family" narrowly have required a biological or marital tie between the residents, although the parties
may have intended the term to refer to a living unit. See, e.g., J.T. Hobby & Son v. Family
Homes, 302 N.C. 64, 72, 274 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1981); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, -,
288 N.W.2d 815, 823 (1980).
The Restatement rule requiring a court to apply the technical meaning of technical words
likewise provides little guidance in interpreting the term "family" in a covenant. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 235(b) (1932). Unless both of the original contracting parties were
lawyers, they probably did not intend to attach a technical meaning to the term. Thus, a
court generally will have no basis for giving the term "family" a technical meaning.
71. See, e.g., Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976).

72. See
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d
Id. at 66, 274 S.E.2d at
Id. at 65, 274 S.E.2d at
Id. at 75, 274 S.E.2d at
Id. at 74-75, 274 S.E.2d

§ 233(c) (1932).

174 (1981).
176.
176.
181.
at 180-81.
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parties actually sought. 78 If, for example, no one challenged the use
of the property as a day care center which generates more traffic,
noise, and profits than a group home, then the court would be justified in holding that a group home was not prohibited by the restrictive covenant.
D. Express Prohibition of a Group Home for the Mentally
Retarded
If courts seek to enforce the intent of the parties, a carefully
drafted covenant that expressly prohibits the establishment of any
group home on the property79 should withstand judicial scrutiny
unless the restriction violates public policy or some constitutional
provision. The North Carolina Supreme Court has supported this
view in dictum. In J.T. Hobby, the court permitted the property to
be used for a group home, but noted that "[n]othing we have said
herein ought to be interpreted to mean that restrictive covenants
cannot be drafted so as to regulate the character of the structures
erected . . . or their utilization."' 0 Other courts also have intimated that a properly drafted restriction would be enforceable. In
Jayno Heights Landowners Association v. Preston,s for example,
the Michigan Court of Appeals enforced a restrictive covenant
against a home for elderly women. The court distinguished Boston78. Although the courts are split, a majority have held that the subsequent actions of the
parties may be considered in determining whether the parties intended to create a servitude. See, e.g., McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302, 183 N.W. 771 (1921). But see Werner v.
Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919) (minority view).

79. In addition to expressly prohibiting any use of the property for a group home, the
covenanting parties can achieve a similar result by expressly prohibiting any mentally retarded individual from living on the property, or by defining "family" as individuals related
by blood or marriage. The enforceability of the covenant, however, depends upon the satisfaction of certain requirements. See supra note 14. The primary problem for parties seeking

to create such a covenant is establishing privity of estate in those jurisdictions where simultaneous privity (transfer of land simultaneously with the creation of the restriction) is re-

quired for the covenant to run. The parties can meet this requirement, however, merely by
transferring their separate interests to a strawman, who then would reconvey the property

subject to the restrictive covenant.
80. 302 N.C. at 75, 274 S.E.2d at 182. See generally State ex rel. Region II Child & Family Servs. v. District Court, 609 P.2d 245, 248 (Mont. 1980) ("[n]othing in the language of

the restrictive covenant here requires a construction that the 'family' should be a biologically single unit. Accordingly, we hold the use allowed here is one within the ambit and
intent of the restrictive covenant.").
81. 85 Mich. App. 443, 271 N.W.2d 268 (1978).
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Edison Protective Association v. Paulist Fathersa2-a case allowing priests to occupy a single-family dwelling-on the ground
that the covenant in Jayno restricted the residence to "one single
family unit,"8 3 whereas the covenant in Boston-Edison was silent
concerning the allowable occupants. In a later decision, Malcolm v.
Shamie,8 4 the Michigan court distinguished Jayno on the basis of
the distinction between structure and use. In Malcolm, the court
permitted the continued operation of a group home for mentally
retarded women despite a restrictive covenant. In reaching that decision, the court noted the similarity between the covenant before
it and the covenant in Bellarmine Hills,8 5 which merely restricted
the type of structure that could be built upon the property. The
court concluded that Jayno was distinguishable, therefore, on the
ground that the covenant in Jayno restricted the use of the property, rather than the type of structure. The apparent need to distinguish Jayno evidences an underlying concern for the potential
validity of a properly drafted restrictive covenant.
Even if the covenant is properly drafted, a court may refuse to
enforce the covenant if it violates public policy or some constitutional provision." In McMillan v. Iserman,87 for example, lot owners amended the restrictive covenants in their deeds to prohibit
the operation of any state-licensed group home on the property.
The defendant, who planned to operate such a facility, had purchased his lot before the amendment. In addition to holding that
the restriction was unenforceable because the defendant had relied
on the previous restrictive covenants in purchasing his lot, the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that the restriction was invalid on
public policy grounds. 8

82. 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847 (1943); see also supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
83. 85 Mich. App. at -,
271 N.W.2d at 270.
84. 95 Mich. App. 132, 290 N.W.2d 101 (1980).
85. 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978); see also Leland Acres Home Owners Ass'n
v. R.T. Partnership, 106 Mich. App. 790, -,
308 N.W.2d 648, 651 (1981) (specific language of the covenant held to be very similar to that in Malcolm and, therefore, applied
only to type of structure).
86. For further discussion of the public policy and constitutional grounds for invalidating
restrictive covenants, see infra text accompanying notes 123-99.
87. 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559 (1982).
88. Id. at -, 327 N.W.2d at 563.
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III. COMMERCIAL NATURE OF HOME As AFFECTING A RESTRICTION'S
VALIDITY

Courts consistently have been concerned with the commercial
nature of group homes. 89 In fact, in some cases the profit making
nature of the home has determined the outcome.90 In Seaton v.
Clifford,"' for example, the California Court of Appeals focused
primarily on the commercial nature of a group home in determining whether to enforce a restrictive covenant which limited the
property to a single-family residence. The defendant in Seaton operated a group home which housed a small number of mentally retarded individuals. Holding that the defendant had violated the
covenant, the court noted that the defendant had received $1392
per month in compensation for operating the group home and had
employed two individuals to work in the home:
[T]he maintenance of a commercial "boarding house," to use defendant's own terminology,, which
dence" to paying customers, is not
purposes" as that latter phrase is
erence to property use. . . . [W]e
defendant's business and that
92
home ....

in essence is providing "resisynonymous with "residential
commonly interpreted in refsee little distinction between
of a motel, inn [or] rest

A majority of courts have held that, although the commercial nature of a group home may have some relevance, that characteristic
should not be determinative.9 3 In J.T. Hobby, for example, the

89. See, e.g., Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972); City of
Livonia v. Department of Social ServE., 119 Mich. App. 806, 328 N.W.2d 1 (1982); Beverly
Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich. App. 322, 317 N.W.2d 611 (1982); Jayno Heights Landowners Ass'n v. Preston, 85 Mich. App. 443, 271 N.W.2d 268 (1978), Costley v. Caromin
House, 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981); J.T. Hobby & Son v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. 64, 274
S.E.2d 174 (1981); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 42, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980).
90. See, e.g., Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 52, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782 (1972)
("The restrictions are not aimed at the mentally retarded they are aimed at the commercial
aspects of defendant's activity.").
91. 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972).
92. Id. at 51, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 781. The court also rejected any argument based on public
policy, stating that the government could always exercise its power of eminent domain. Id.
at 52, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
93. Compare Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1982); City of
Livonia v. Department of Social Servs., 119 Mich. App. 806, 328 N.W.2d 1 (1982); Beverly
Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich. App. 322, 317 N.W.2d 611 (1982); Costley v. Caromin
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North Carolina Supreme Court permitted the defendant to continue operating a group home for five mentally retarded adults. Although noting that the home was a nonprofit corporation, the court
maintained that this factor was not controlling: "[ilt is [the] purpose and method of operation which serves to distinguish defend. . . from that normally incident to a boarding
ant's usage
94
house.
Under either approach, a court attempts to distinguish group
homes from other types of group living arrangements, such as fraternities, convents, and boarding houses. Because of the need to
distinguish these various uses, a court should address the commercial status of a group home, but only to the extent that the commercial status of the home relates to the parties' intent. In other
words, the court should consider the commercial nature of the
home as a factor in determining whether the group home conforms
95
with the "residential" or "family" requirements of the covenant.
If the commercial nature alone was determinative, absurd results
which were not contemplated by the parties could arise. Depending
upon the precise language in a restrictive covenant, a homeowner
who received a job transfer might be unable to rent his home
pending its sale because of the commercial nature of the rental
agreement. Moreover, certain unobtrusive activities in the home
also might be precluded, such as school teachers grading papers or
lawyers preparing cases.
A few courts have considered the effect that commercial use has
upon the outward appearance of a group home. In Jayno, for example, the defendant built a single-family residence upon a lot
that he had purchased, and later leased that house to the codefendants, who used the property to provide a home for elderly
women. Holding that the defendant had violated the covenant, the

House, 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981); J.T. Hobby & Son v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. 64, 274
S.E.2d 174 (1981); and Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 42, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980), with Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972); and Jayno Heights Landowners Ass'n v. Preston, 85 Mich. App. 443, 271 N.W.2d 268 (1978).
94. 302 N.C. at 73, 274 S.E.2d at 180. The court also discussed the family character of the
usage. Id.
95. The commercial nature of the home also may be a factor for the court to consider in
determining whether to void the covenant on public policy grounds. See infra text accompanying note 196.
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Michigan Court of Appeals observed that "[tihere is nothing in the
record to indicate that the residents of the property at issue are
anything more than a group of unrelated individuals sharing a
common roof."' In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished Boston-Edison, in which the Michigan Supreme Court
permitted six priests and their two servants to continue living in a
home despite a restrictive covenant that provided that the home
could be used as a "single dwelling house and [for] dwelling house
purposes only. '9 7 In comparing the two cases, the court in Jayno
stressed the noncommercial nature of the priests' living
arrangement 8
By focusing on the commercial nature of the group home only to
the extent of its impact on the residential nature of the neighborhood, the court's approach in Jayno was consistent with the approach that other courts have taken in considering the applicability of restrictive covenants to boarding houses and fraternities.",
For example, courts often distinguish between individual boarders,
who merely pay rent, and the boarding houses themselves. This
distinction can be illustrated by comparing Austin v. Richardson0 "
with Andrews v. Metropolitan Building Co.10 1 In Austin, the
Texas Court of Appeals held that the renting of a room in a home
did not violate a covenant which restricted the home to residential
purposes and provided that the occupant was not to operate any
commercial enterprises on the premises.10 2 In contrast, the Missouri Supreme Court in Andrews held that the defendant had violated a similar covenant by converting his home into a more extensive boarding house to support his family.103
In those cases in which the residents are members of a religious
order, courts will make a similar distinction between residential
uses and residential plus religious or business functions. In BostonEdison, for example, the court held that the priests had not vio-

96. 85 Mich. App. at -,
271 N.W.2d at 270.
97. 306 Mich. at 256, 10 N.W.2d at 848.
98. 85 Mich. App. at
, 271 N.W.2d at 270.
99. See Annot., supra note 57, §§ 6-7.
100. 288 S.W. 180 (Tex. Ct. App. 1926).
101. 349 Mo. 927, 163 S.W.2d 1024 (1942).
102. 288 S.W. at 181.
103. 349 Mo. at -,
163 S.W.2d 1030-31.

438

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:421

lated the covenant because they used the residence only for residential purposes. 10 4 In contrast, the Missouri Court of Appeals in
Cash v. Catholic Diocese1 05 enjoined the Catholic Diocese from
building a home for nuns in a neighborhood that was restricted to
detached single-family dwellings. The home was to have thirteen
bedrooms, an office, dining room, parlor, and chapel. The court
maintained that there are "other words [than single-family residence] that describe such a building. . . . The residence ...
might be described as a boarding house, sorority, or club. Or if one
wanted to emphasize the religious status which its occupants
"101
would have in common, one might call it a convent...

IV.

EMINENT DOMAIN AND ITS IMPACT ON GROUP HOMES

Assuming that the court upholds the validity of the restrictive
covenant, a question arises whether the state should be bound by
the restriction if it owns or operates the group home. 10 7 In a significant minority of jurisdictions, courts have held that restrictive covenants are not sufficient property interests to require compensation for their taking.0 "
Commentators have made a number of arguments against treating restrictive covenants as property. The most basic argument is
that restrictive covenants are contracts and, therefore, cannot be
property. 109 In addition, commentators have argued that public
policy requires a finding that restrictive covenants are not property
because "an owner should not by 'mere contract,' be allowed to
inhibit governmental bodies from performing their functions or to
compel the payment of compensation for such performance." 110 If
restrictive covenants do not constitute property rights requiring
104. 306 Mich. at 255, 10 N.W.2d at 847.
105. 414 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
106. Id. at 349.
107. Most group homes are licensed by the state. See infra note 208. Many group homes
also receive state aid as independent contractors working for the state. See, e.g., VA. CODE
§ 37.1-121 (Supp. 1983).
108. W. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASsoRY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 128-39 (1977); see, e.g.,
Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85
(1939).
109. E.g., W. STOEBUCK, supra note 108, at 132-33. This argument emphasizes form over
substance.
110. Id. at 134.
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compensation, then in many situations involving group homes the
covenant will not pose any problem because the state simply can
exercise its power of eminent domain and thereafter ignore the restrictions of the covenant."' Although a majority of the courts
have not adopted this position, recent state court decisions provide
support for this position." 2
In those jurisdictions that have held that restrictive covenants
represent property rights and that a violation of those covenants
by the state constitutes a taking of private property,"13 the state
must condemn the property rights imposed by the covenant and
pay compensation. Condemnation is perhaps the most economical
means by which a state can contend with a restrictive covenant.
Depending on the measure of damages, the required compensation
may be sufficiently small so as not to unduly burden the operation
of the group home.
The usual measure of damages for the taking of property rights
inuring under a restrictive covenant is the reduction in value of
surrounding properties caused by the governmental activity." 4 To
illustrate, suppose that the owners of contiguous lots A, X, Y, and
Z restrict the use of their respective lots, and that thereafter a
group home is begun on lot A. Theoretically, the owners of the adjoining lots X, Y, and Z have suffered a loss in that their property
no longer enjoys the full benefit of the restriction imposed on lot
A. The damages, therefore, would equal the diminution in value of
the lots X, Y, and Z as a result of the operation of the group home.
Under an alternative method, damages are measured by the dif-

111. Any inverse condemnation proceeding would fail, absent a due process argument,
because the state has not taken any property.
112. See, e.g., Ryan v. Town of Manalapan, 414 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1982). Recent decisions,
however, reflect no clear trend toward either position. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 108, at 129.
For a general discussion of the competing views on whether a restrictive covenant constitutes a sufficient property interest to require compensation, see W. STOEBUCK, supra note
108, at 128-38. See also Aigler, Measure of Compensationfor Extinguishment of Easement
by Condemnation, 1945 Wis. L. REv. 5; Case Note, Constitutional LawlProperty-Restrictive Covenants: Do They Apply to Public Bodies?-Ryan v. Town of
Manalapan, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 667 (1983).
113. Even if the restrictive covenant constitutes a property interest, a state is required to
pay compensation only if a taking has occurred. For a discussion of whether the state's
operation of a group home on property subject to a restrictive covenant constitutes a taking,
see infra text accompanying notes 209-20.
114. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 108, at 136-37.
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ference in the value of the surrounding property with and without
the restriction. This measure ignores the manner in which the government uses the property and focuses instead on the value of lots
X, Y, and Z without the restriction.'" Because of the different focus of these two measures, a court could reach substantially different compensation awards, depending upon which measure is used.
The difference between these two measures of damages perhaps
can be understood better by considering the operation of each
measure in a typical nuisance suit. Assume that an unpolluted
stream first runs through land owned by A and then through land
owned by X. The land of X is worth more if he can extract a promise from A that A will not pollute the stream in the future. The
difference in the value of X's land with and without the benefit of
A's promise reflects the second measure of damages.
A court, however, can apply a different measure of damages if
the government condemns A's property and thereafter pollutes the
stream. The value of A's promise now can be measured by the difference between the value of X's land before and after condemnation or before and after the discharge of pollutants. The known
nuisance will affect the value of the property more than the potential nuisance.
In cases involving restrictive covenants, the first measure of
damages normally will produce a higher damage award than will
the second measure.1 1 6 Courts generally apply the higher measure
117
of damages whenever a partial taking of property has occurred,
as opposed to a complete taking in which the courts normally will
apply the lower measure of damages. Because a state's condemnation of the property rights embodied in a restrictive covenant constitutes a partial taking of property, the courts should determine
damages on the basis of the actual diminution in the value of the
property as a result of the group home's operation, rather than on
the basis of the second measure of damages." 8 One could argue,
however, that the second measure of damages better serves the underlying policies behind the condemnation award because it com115. Id.
116. This assumes, of course, that a group home affects the value of adjoining property.
But see infra note 197 and accompanying text.
117. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 108, at 137.
118. Id.
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pensates the adjoining land owners for the loss of the covenant's
protection rather than for the actual damage caused.1 19
Although this argument has some validity, courts are likely to
apply the first measure of damages because, under that measure,
the court's award resembles severance damages. Severance damages attempt to compensate for the loss in value of the remaining
property by reason of a partial taking and recognize the enhanced
value of the whole property before the taking. For example, when
the government condemns one-half of a farm's total acreage, a
damage award of one-half of the farm's total value may not reflect
accurately the loss suffered by the farmer, because the property as
a whole has an enhanced value which is greater than the sum of its
parts.
Although awarding severance damages is appropriate in those
cases in which the government has condemned a physical part of
the property, such an award is inappropriate in those situations in
which the government condemns the property rights embodied in a
restrictive covenant because the physical integrity of the property
is left unaltered. By awarding severance damages, the courts elevate form over substance.
When the government uses property in a manner that violates a
restrictive covenant, the government not only leaves the physical
nature of the property intact, but also leaves the restrictive covenant basically unaltered. The restrictive covenant remains enforceable to the extent that the parties can enjoin other uses, such as a
grocery store, a boarding house or a fraternity. In awarding damages, the court should consider this factor. 120 The court also should
recognize that often the possibility of a group home was of little or
no concern to the original parties to the covenant. In fact, in today's housing market the developer, who has little long-term inter-

119. Under the first measure of damages, the government could argue reasonably that the
extinguishment of a property right should not require compensation if no damage results.
Contra W. STOEBUCK, supra note 108, at 136.
120. A court should consider whether home buyers are sophisticated enough to require a
reduction in the price of the home because this provision of the covenant is no longer enforceable. This consideration, however, is somewhat circular. If the public is aware that a
group home may be placed in any neighborhood, the buyer must realize that the purchase
price reflects this fact and, therefore, he suffers no compensatory loss if the covenant later is
violated.
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est in the property, generally is the party responsible for the creation of a restrictive covenant. Finally, the court must consider
whether any loss actually has occurred as a result of the government's use of the property. Evidence suggests that group homes
121
have no significant impact on the value of surrounding property.
Based upon this evidence, adjoining landowners should not be entitled to any compensation because they have suffered no measureable loss. The adjoining landowners may be entitled to equitable
1 22
relief, however, even in the absence of identifiable economic loss.
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

The decision by the United States Supreme Court in Shelley v.
Kraemer123 must be considered when examining the discriminatory
impact of any restrictive covenant. In Shelley, the Court invalidated a private restrictive covenant that discriminated on the basis
of race because judicial enforcement of the covenant would constitute state action within the meaning of the fourteenth
124
amendment.
In determining whether Shelley prohibits the enforcement of
covenants restricting the institution of group homes for the mentally retarded, a court must consider two issues. First, the court
must ascertain whether enforcement of the covenants constitutes
state action. If the court determines that state action is involved,
then the court must ask whether the state's involvement violates
any provision of the United States Constitution. 125 In answering
this question, a court should note the Supreme Court's reluctance
since Shelley to expand its holding beyond restrictive covenants
having racial overtones. 12 6 This reluctance is probably due in part
to the overwhelming discussion generated by Shelley.1 27 Commen121. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
122. In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, a court has the power to balance
the relative harm. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.38 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
123. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
124. Id. at 20.
125. See generally L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-49 (1978).
126. See Leedes, State Action Limitations on Courts and CongressionalPower, 60 N.C.
L. REV. 747, 765-70 (1982).
127. See, e.g., Haber, Notes on the Limits of Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 811
(1964); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473
(1962); Leedes, supra note 126, at 761-70; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
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tators generally have criticized Shelley on the ground that the decision, on its face, would require all private agreements to satisfy
constitutional standards because the enforceability of the covenants almost always depends on state court action.12
A. Decisions Addressing State Action and Restrictive Covenants
In those cases in which courts have considered the validity of
restrictive covenants affecting the mentally retarded, few courts
have discussed whether state enforcement of those covenants constitutes state action violative of the fourteenth amendment. None
of those courts has held that Shelley applies to such covenants, 129
perhaps because of the belief that Shelley is inapplicable apart
from restrictive covenants involving racial discrimination. 130 This
belief is not universally shared, however, in light of three decisions
that found Shelley applicable in contexts other than racial discrimination. In Riley v. Stoves, 31 for example, the Arizona Court
of Appeals found state action in the judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant that excluded families with children. The court,
nevertheless, upheld the covenant under a rational basis standard

tutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). For a recent discussion of the diverse problems

associated with state action, see Symposium, The Public/PrivateDistinction,130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1289-1609 (1982).

128. L. TRB, supra note 125, at 1156.
129. See Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398,

_

181 Cal. Rptr. 703, 711 (1982)

(Staniforth, J., concurring) (the applicability of Shelley under California common law was
unclear); McMillan v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559 (1982) (dissenting opinion rejected the contention that Shelley applied even though the majority did not rely upon
Shelley in reaching its decision); State ex rel. Region I[ Child & Family Serva. v. District
Court, 609 P.2d 245 (Mont. 1980) (the court did not have to determine the applicability of
Shelley because the defendant had not breached the covenant); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis.
2d 421, -,
288 N.W.2d 815, 823 n.2 (1980) (the court determined that the defendant had
not breached the covenant and, therefore, did not address the applicability of Shelley).
130. The courts are divided concerning the applicability of Shelley in contexts other than
racial discrimination. See generally, Travalio, Suffer the Little Children-But Not in My
Neighborhood:A ConstitutionalView of Age-Restrictive Housing, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 295, 324
(1979); Note, Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants Against Children: An Equal
Protection Analysis, 17 ARiz. L. REv. 717 (1975); Note, Housing Discrimination Against
Children: The Legal Status of a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559 (1977); Note,
Restrictive Covenants and Religious Uses: The ConstitutionalInterplay, 29 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 993 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Covenants and Religious Uses].
131. 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
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of review. 131 Similarly, in Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 33 the Florida District Court of Appeals concluded that the
judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants discriminating on the
basis of age constituted impermissible state action because the covenant impinged on the fundamental right to procreate. 4 Finally,
an Ohio Circuit Court in West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate13 5
held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited judicial enforcement of a covenant restricting religious use of the property. These
decisions, however, do not reflect the majority position.136 As one
commentator has pointed out, a number of state and federal court
decisions reflect a "double standard"-one for racial discrimination and one for all other types of discrimination.137 Most courts,
however, fail to explain the basis for this double standard. 3
B. Analysis of The Double Standard for State Action
In perhaps the most intelligible discussion of Shelley, Professor
Tribe suggests that judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant
does not necessarily constitute state action because of the court's
duty to act in a neutral manner:
As conventionally understood, the [equal protection] clause
commanded governmental neutrality with respect to such matters as race ....
If [Shelley] was rightly decided, as I believe it
was, the reason is either that neutrality does not suffice in matters of racial segregation in housing, or that the state's contract
and property rules, including elaborate doctrines designed to
limit the enforceability of restraints on the alienation of land,
were not in fact neutral in their enforcement of racial restraints
on alienation while treating many other restraints as unenforce132. 22 Ariz. App. at -, 526 P.2d at 753. Defendants' counsel apparently did not argue
that the covenant infringed a fundamental right.
133. 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
134. Id. at 1088.
135. 24 Ohio Misc. 66, 261 N.E.2d 196 (1969). This decision apparently is the only reported case that has applied Shelley to restrictive covenants prohibiting religious use of the
property.
136. For a list of cases addressing the applicability of Shelley to restrictive covenants
prohibiting any religious use of the property, see Note, Covenants and Religious Uses,
supra note 130, at 994 n.9, 1002 n.69.
137. Travalio, supra note 130, at 326-27 & nn.201, 208-14.
138. Id. at 327 nn.208-14.
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able. The issue. . becomes a matter for resolution in terms of
the substantive rules of equal protection ....
I
Under this analysis, a court considering the validity of a restrictive
covenant involving the mentally retarded needs to determine
whether the mentally retarded require greater protection under the
Constitution than the protection offered by judicial neutrality.
In determining the constitutional protection required for the
mentally retarded, the courts can look to the zoning cases for guidance. These cases are beneficial because they reflect the degree of
constitutional protection required when the state acts directly. Of
the various constitutional challenges to exclusionary zoning that
commentators have raised, 140 the constitutional requirement of
equal protection provides the strongest support for the proposition
that the government does not act neutrally when enforcing restrictive covenants against the mentally retarded.""
In analyzing a case on equal protection grounds, a court may apply one of three different standards of review depending upon the
basis of the classification, the nature of the interests impaired by
the classification, and the state interests offered in support of the
classification. Traditionally, courts will uphold a discriminatory
classification set forth in a statute if a rational relationship exists
between the classification and the state interest. 4 1 Whenever the
discriminatory classification is directed at a suspect class14 or the
classification burdens the exercise of a fundamental right,144 however, the court will apply a stricter standard of review. Under this
strict scrutiny test, the state must demonstrate that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. In cases
involving sex discrimination or illegitimacy classifications, the
courts recently have adopted an intermediate standard of review. 145 Under this standard, the court examines the classification
to ensure that it is substantially related to the achievement of an

139. L. TRIE, supra note 125, at 1170.
140. See generally Comment, Zoning, supra note 3; Comment, Exclusion, supra note 3.
141. Commentators also have challenged the covenants as an impediment to the constitutional right to travel. See, e.g., Comment, Exclusion, supra note 3.
142. L. TRIBE, supra note 125, at 994-96.
143. Id. at 1012-32.
144. Id. at 1002.
145. Id. at 1063-66.
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important governmental objective. 141
Because the covenant in Shelley restricted use of the property
by blacks, the covenant impinged upon the rights of a suspect
class. Given the judicial reluctance to extend Shelley, a court probably will not find that state action is involved in the enforcement
of a restrictive covenant unless the covenant is directed at a suspect class or burdens the exercise of a fundamental right. 147 Someone challenging a covenant that prohibits any use of the property
by mentally retarded individuals, therefore, must establish that
the mentally retarded constitute a suspect class or that the covenant impinges upon a fundamental right. Unless the restrictive
covenant affects either of these interests, a court probably will enforce the covenant, particularly in light of the fact that the United
States Supreme Court has permitted substantial discrimination in
zoning upon the state's showing of a rational relationship. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,14 8 the Court applied a rational relationship test and upheld a zoning ordinance restricting the entire
village to families related by blood or marriage. The Court later
held in Moore v. City of East Cleveland Heights,'49 however, that
an ordinance which excluded collateral relatives impinged on a
fundamental right. Absent a finding of a suspect class or a fundamental right, courts will permit a significant amount of private
discrimination.
Courts consider a right as fundamental only if the right is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.' 5 0 Because
the Constitution does not recognize explicitly the right of the mentally retarded to reside in a group home, one must argue that the
right is implicitly embodied in the Constitution. The probability
that this argument will be successful, however, is low. Although the
Court in Moore considered as fundamental the right to live with an

146. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
147. State action occurs in the enforcement of a restrictive covenant only if the court does
not act neutrally. See supra text accompanying note 139. The United States Supreme Court
has determined that a court acts neutrally except in the enforcement of a racially discriminatory covenant. Unless the discrimination rises to a comparable level, the Court probably
would not follow Shelley or find state action in the enforcement of other covenants.
148. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
149. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
150. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
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extended family, 151 the Court was concerned with the more traditional aspects of an extended family. 152 Further, there is no underlying fundamental right to housing. 53 Although the Court recognized in O'Connorv. Donaldson5 4 that a person has the right to be
free if he does not pose a danger to society, one does not have a
fundamental right to live in the place of his choice.155 One can argue, however, that the right to receive treatment in the least restrictive environment necessarily implies that the mentally retarded have a fundamental right to live in a group home. Despite
the logic of this argument, its validity is questionable in light of
the United States Supreme Court's recent remand of the leading
56
lower court decision asserting such a right.
If restrictive covenants that prohibit the mentally retarded from
using the property do not burden the exercise of a fundamental
right, one is left to consider whether the mentally retarded constitute a suspect class. The Court has articulated several factors that
distinguish a suspect class: an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth"; 5" a "history of purposeful
unequal treatment"; 58 and a "position of political powerlessness."' 59 The developmentally handicapped, as a class, easily satisfy these criteria.6 0 The vast majority of mentally retarded people
have been retarded since birth,'"' have received unequal treatment

151. 431 U.S. at 520.
152. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974). Cf. Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland Heights, 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). Contra Comment, Zoning, supra note 3, at 406-07.
153. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 683 (1978).
154. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
155. Contra Comment, Zoning, supra note 3, at 405-06.
156. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afl'd, 612
F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded,451 U.S. 1 (1981). See also Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). Contra Comment, Zoning, supra note 3, at 407-08. See generally Ferleger & Scott,
Rights and Dignity: Congress, the Supreme Court, and People with Disabilities After Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 327 (1983).
157. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
158. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
159. Id.
160. This is not necessarily the case with mental illness, which may be transitory in nature. See Comment, Exclusion, supra note 3, at 935.
161. C. BARLOW, MENTAL RETARDATION AND RELATED DISORDERS 3 (1978) ("Mental retardation is the symptomatic expression of neurological disease which usually was active during
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by both the government and private individuals in a wide range of
endeavors,"6 2 and have been rendered politically powerless by stat1 3
ute in many jurisdictions. 1
Despite this history of unequal treatment, the Court probably
would not label the mentally retarded a suspect class. Because a
mental handicap resembles a physical handicap in terms of the individual's ability to perform or contribute,' the Court probably
would classify the mentally handicapped and the physically handicapped in the same manner. Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson,'s5 stated in dicta that a physical
disability is a nonsuspect classification: "[W]hat differentiates sex
from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability,
and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society." Another factor which is antithetical to a
judicial finding that the mentally retarded constitute a suspect
class is that a classification based on one's mental capacity does
not raise the moral indignation that is associated with a racially
discriminatory classification. 166

the time of gestation or the prenatal period, and less often during infancy and childhood.");
M. HUTT & R. GIBBEY, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD 96 (1976) ("The more we have
learned about the development of mental retardation, the more we have to come to view the
problem as one of interacting factors: the interaction of genetic factors with prenatal or
postnatal environmental factors.").
162. A number of revealing books explore the long history of society's mistreatment of the
mentally retarded. See, e.g., S. DAVIES, THE MENTALLY RETARDED IN SOCIETY (1959); M.
Hurr & R. GIBBEY, supra note 161. The early history of society's treatment of the mentally
retarded reveals that the Spartans, Romans, and Greeks dealt with the mentally retarded
through abandonment and killing, and that Luther and Calvin regarded mental incompetents as being "filled with Satan." These beliefs continued until the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries when institutionalization of the mentally retarded began. Two
photographic essays graphically portray the dehumanizing effects of these residential
warehoues. See B. BLATT, SOULS IN EXTREMIS: AN ANTHOLOGY ON VICTIMS AND VICTIMIZERS
(1973); B. BLATT & F. KAPLAN, CHRISTMAS IN PURGATORY (1974).
163. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1 (West Supp. 1983-1984) (disqualifying the mentally retarded from voting); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-2, 8.01-338 (Supp. 1983) (disqualifying the
mentally retarded from jury service); Wis. CONST. art. 3, § 2 (disqualifying the mentally
retarded from voting).
164. See generally Comment, Zoning, supra note 3, at 403.
165. 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J.).
166. Cases involving the mentally retarded do not create the gut reaction that was present in Shelley. For a gut reaction analysis of Shelley, see Friendly, The Public Private
Penumbra-FourteenYears Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1292 (1982) (borrowing this

1984]

THE MENTALLY RETARDED AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

449

VI. PUBLIC POLICY AS A BASIS FOR VOIDING RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS

All the arguments thus far discussed for invalidating restrictive
covenants are ineffectual because they are either within the control
of the original contracting parties or are so unpersuasive that
group homes may be excluded effectively by a well-planned effort."6 7 The only effective means for voiding a restrictive covenant,
therefore, is on the basis of public policy. In determining whether
to enforce a restrictive covenant, the court must consider two public policy issues. First, the court must consider whether any property owner should be allowed to encumber the future use of his
property. A discussion of the sound public policy arguments
against the running of restrictive covenants is beyond the scope of
this Article. It is sufficient for the purposes of this discussion to
note simply that, although commentators continue to debate the
issue, most jurisdictions have decided generally to uphold restric16 8
tive covenants.
A court, nevertheless, may determine that a specific restriction
is invalid on public policy grounds. As early as 1834,169 courts invalidated a number of specific restrictive covenants 17 0 on public
policy grounds because of vagueness or the duration of the
7
restriction.1 '
As a majority of courts have recognized, public policy as reflected by legislative and constitutional directives favors the development of group homes for the mentally retarded. Of this majoranalysis from Paul Freund, who applied it in his explanation of Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
167. Courts normally have upheld provisions which allow parties to amend restrictive covenants if the parties act reasonably and in good faith. See generally Browder, supra note 56,
at 32 n.99; Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U.
Cm. L. REv. 253, 291 (1976). In McMillan v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559
(1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the amendment of a restrictive covenant in
order to exclude a group home for the mentally retarded was invalid because the proposed
operator had purchased the property prior to, and without notice of, the amendment, and in
reliance on the preexisting covenant.
168. See generally Browder, supra note 56, at 33. Compare Clark, The American Law
Institute's Law of Real Covenants, 52 YALE L.J. 699 (1943), with Rundell, Judge Clark on
the American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants: A Comment, 53 YALE L.J. 312 (1944).
169. See generally Browder, supra note 56, at 16 n.14.
170. See id. at 36 n.118.
171. Id. at 37-39.
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ity, perhaps the Michigan courts have been the most articulate in
developing the public policy basis for voiding restrictive covenants
that exclude the mentally retarded. These courts have cited both
constitutional and statutory enactments as evidence of this public
policy.17 2 For example, these courts have noted that the Michigan
Constitution provides that "[i]nstitutions, programs and services
for the care. . . of [the] mentally. . . handicapped shall always be
fostered and supported. ' 17 3 These courts also have observed that
Michigan's zoning laws provide that "[i]n order to implement the
policy of this state that persons in need of community residential
care shall not be excluded by zoning. . . [such a facility] shall be
considered a residential use.' ' 7 4 Based upon these constitutional
and statutory manifestations of public policy, the Michigan Court
of Appeals concluded in Bellarmine Hills Association v. Residential Systems 17 5 that public policy requires the promotion of "the
development and maintenance of quality programs and facilities
for the care and treatment of the mentally handicapped.' 7 6
Although public policy may favor the development of group
homes for the mentally retarded, public policy will not necessarily
override the contractual agreements of private individuals. 17 7 For
example, in Jayno Heights Landowners Association v. Preston,
the Michigan Court of Appeals maintained that the public policy
reflected in the state's zoning laws was not determinative with regard to the validity of restrictive covenants. 7 8 The courts thus
must determine whether the policy favoring group homes should
take precedence over the countervailing policy of freedom of
contract.
Although the articulated test for determining when a court

172. See, e.g., McMUllan v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559 (1982); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978). Accord
Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1982); State ex rel. Region II
Child & Family Servs. v. District Court, 609 P.2d 245 (Mont. 1980).
173. MICH. CONsT. art. 8, § 8.
174. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 125.216 (Supp. 1983-1984).
175. 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978).
176. Id. at 558, 269 N.W.2d at 674.
177. Although a state may have formulated a policy, a state cannot necessarily apply that
policy to private individuals. See supra text accompanying notes 123-66.
178. 85 Mich. App. at -, 271 N.W.2d at 270. See, e.g., Morgan v. Matheson, 362 Mich.
535, 107 N.W.2d 825 (1961); Phillips v. Lawler, 259 Mich. 567, 244 N.W. 165 (1932).
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should invalidate a private agreement on public policy grounds
varies little from state to state, the courts have applied this test
disparately."' A review of Michigan cases provides a useful backdrop from which to consider the competing views. Michigan courts
long have interpreted restrictive covenants, and have developed a
relatively fixed test of whether a restrictive covenant violates public policy. Under the test adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court,
a restrictive covenant's validity depends on "the community common sense and common conscience, extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, public health, public
safety, public welfare, and the like. It is that general and well settled public opinion relating to man's plain palpable duty to his fellow men. .. ."18o Despite the egalitarian nature of this test, it is
sufficiently ambiguous to allow courts to uphold restrictive covenants that promote improper causes. For example, in Sipes v. McGee,1 81 the companion case to Shelley v. Kraemer, the Michigan
Supreme Court cited this test as support for its holding that racially restrictive covenants were not contrary to public policy. 8 2
Applying this test, a number of courts have concluded that restrictive covenants excluding the mentally retarded should be void
on public policy grounds. Several considerations raised by the dissent in McMillan v. Iserman, however, caution against immediate
acceptance of this conclusion. The dissent in McMillan asserted
that a court should void such restrictive covenants "only in cases
plainly within the reasons on which the doctrine rests. ' 183 The dissent thus objected to the majority's invalidation of the restrictive
covenant at issue in McMillan because the dissent maintained that
the constitutional and statutory provisions18 4 upon which the doc-

179. Compare McMillan v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559 (1982) (restrictive covenants excluding the mentally retarded violate the public policy of Michigan), with
Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (the restrictions do not violate the
public policy of Texas), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 377 (1982). See generally Browder, supra
note 56; Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935).
180. Skutt v. Grand Rapids, 275 Mich. 258, 264-65, 266 N.W. 344, 346 (1936).
181. 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
182. 316 Mich. at 631, 25 N.W.2d at 645.
183. 120 Mich. App. at -,
327 N.W.2d at 566 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting).
184. The constitutional and legislative provisions upon which the majority relied were the
provisions mentioned previously. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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trine rested did not support the majority's holding. More specifically, applying reasoning similar to that noted in the discussion of
the term "family,' 18 5 the dissent argued that the legislators intended that the zoning statute prevent only the exclusion of individuals through zoning and not through other practices."8 6 The dissent also contended that the majority had failed to achieve an
appropriate balance between the two competing public policies:
"[i]n view of the admonition. . . to act with caution in determining whether contracts are void as contrary to public policy and to
apply the doctrine only in cases plainly within the reason on which
preclusive effect to one of the
the doctrine rests, we cannot give
i8 7
two competing public policies.'
The easy solution to the concerns expressed by the dissent in
McMillan would be for the legislature to define public policy more
clearly. 88 Absent such a clarification, however, the courts should
rank public policies which, for the most part, courts develop. Although some courts may require that the legislature initially define
public policy,'8 9 the basic power to void a contract resides with the
courts.9 0
After considering the concerns raised by the dissent in McMillan, if the court nevertheless decides to void a restrictive covenant,
the court then must determine the extent to which the restriction
should be unenforceable. In other words, the court must determine
the types of group homes to allow on the property despite the re185. The dissent's argument implicitly recognizes the observation made in conjunction
with the discussion of the term "family" that the intent of a zoning statute may be very
different from the intent in a private restrictive covenant. See supra text accompanying
notes 49-50.
186. The statute's statement of policy specifically stated that the purpose of the statute
was to ensure that "persons . . . shall not be excluded by zoning. . . ." 120 Mich. App. at
__
327 N.W.2d at 566 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
187. Id. at -, 327 N.W.2d at 567.
188. See infra notes 200-32 and accompanying text.
591
189. See, e.g., E. & S. Insulation Co. v. E.L. Jones Constr. Co., 121 Ariz. 468, -,
P.2d 560, 562 (1979) ("[T]he court must look to legislative intent to determine whether a
contract contrary to law is void as against public policy."); Melodies, Inc. v. La Pierre, 4
A.D.2d 982, 167 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1957) (court must look to the state's constitution and laws to
find a basis for holding a contract void as against public policy). See also Jackson v. Sam
Finley, Inc., 366 F.2d 148, 154 (5th Cir. 1966) (Mississippi employs a restrictive view of a
court's power to declare contracts unenforceable, requiring a "showing that the contract be
prohibited by 'express terms or the fair implication' of a statute or judicial decision.").
190. See Browder, supra note 56; Gellhorn, supra note 179.
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strictive covenant. In making this determination, Michigan courts
consistently consider three factors: "(1) the specific language of the
restriction; (2) the nature of the proposed operation with particular attention paid to its commercial status; and (3) the basis of
affiliation of the residents in the proposed facility." '' Although
the continued utility of this three-pronged test in Michigan is
questionable in light of McMillan's apparent blanket invalidation
of restrictive covenants that prohibit group residential facilities on
public policy grounds, 192 the test and its earlier use in such cases as
Bellarmine Hills provides a useful framework by which to examine
a court's application of public policy.
Considering the three prongs in reverse order, the basis of affiliation prong is useful in that its ambiguity allows needed flexibility,
but is less useful in explaining the holdings that courts have
reached. For example, this prong provides no guidance for understanding why, despite similar bases of affiliation, the court in Boston-Edison permitted six priests to live together, whereas the court
in Catholic Diocese prohibited the operation of a group home inhabited by nuns.193 The second prong of the test, which focuses on
the commercial nature of the group home, is likewise ambiguous
because this prong does not indicate why some courts permit the
continued operation of purely profit-motivated day care centers,'
but not profit-motivated boarding houses. 95 Finally, the prong
that focuses on the specific language of the covenant is also unsatisfactory. Because public policy, rather than the parties' intent, is
the controlling factor in this test, the specific language of the covenant should be irrelevant. In light of the inadequacies of this
three-prong test, a more appropriate judicial approach would be to
consider the intent of the parties to the extent that their intent
can be reconciled with the overriding public policy against the exclusion of group homes for the mentally retarded.
A question arises, however, concerning the extent to which a
court can reconcile public policy with the intent of a restrictive

191. City of Livonia v. Department of Social Servs., 119 Mich. App. 806,

-,

328

N.W.2d 1, 4 (1982).
192,
193.
194.
195.

120 Mich. App. 785, -,
327 N.W.2d 559, 562-63 (1982).
See supra text accompanying notes 97-98, 104-05.
See, e.g., Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich. App. 322, 317 N.W.2d 611 (1982).
See, e.g., Andrews v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 349 Mo. 927, 163 S.W.2d 1024 (1942).
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covenant. By entering into restrictive covenants, most parties intend to protect the character of the neighborhood, as well as the
property values. To the extent that a group home does not affect
significantly the character of the neighborhood, public policy and
the covenant should be reconcilable. Such factors as the size, physical characteristics, and commercial nature of the group home
should be relevant, therefore, only to the extent that those factors
affect the neighborhood's character."' e Reconciling public policy
with the parties' intent to preserve property values may be more
difficult theoretically, but in actuality, this reconciliation may be
easier because of empirical data suggesting that group homes for
97
the mentally retarded do not affect property values.
In reconciling public policy and the intent of the parties, one
final precaution must be noted. In jurisdictions with zoning laws
that allow the operation of group homes in single-family residential areas, the statutes typically delineate the permissible size, licensing, and staffing of the group home. 9 Although those statutes
provide readily available guidelines, courts should not equate the
concern of zoning laws with the concerns of restrictive covenants. 9 9 For example, the fact that a zoning ordinance may permit
the operation of a group home housing six mentally retarded individuals does not mean that public policy demands that group
homes of six or fewer residents be allowed in all neighborhoods.
One can imagine situations in which peculiar features of the property would make a group home of six individuals inappropriate.

196. In Cash v. Catholic Diocese, 414 S.W. 2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967), the size of the
home, which would have been 6,000 square feet with thirteen bedrooms, would have altered
dramatically the character of the neighborhood, whereas the presence of nuns in the neighborhood would not have. Thus, while the court could reconcile the religious use of the home
with the covenant, the court could not reconcile the size of the home with the covenant.

197. J. WOLPERT, GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1978); Dear, Impact of
Mental Health Facilitieson Property Values, 13 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 150 (1977);
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES STATE LEGIS. PROJECT OF THE

ABA

COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY

DISABLED, ZONING FOR COMMUNITY HOMES SERVING DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS

2

n.10.
198. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582 (West Supp. 1983-1984) (state will license
group homes of not more than six residents, excluding the operator).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
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STATE STATUTES

State legislatures could relieve the courts from having to determine whether these restrictive covenants violate public policy by
enacting specific statutes. Of course, the courts may have to examine the constitutionality of the statutes. Currently, however,
only four states have enacted statutes restricting the property owner's ability to prevent the operation of a group home for the men200
tally retarded on his property.
A. Is the Statute a Valid Exercise of the Police Power?
In determining whether the statute constitutes a valid exercise
of the state's police power, a court must consider two issues. First,
the court must ask whether the legislative action is within the
state's police power, and second, the court must determine whether
this exercise of the police power satisfies the due process requirement of reasonableness. In light of recent Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the rights of institutionalized patients,20 1
as well as decisions upholding zoning statutes affecting the mentally retarded, 0 2 the state undoubtedly has the right to take steps
to protect the interests of the mentally retarded. Although the
courts may not have fulfilled all of the goals sought by the proponents of group homes, the courts have recognized that in protecting the general welfare, the state has the power to foster the development of group homes. 0 3
The state's exercise of its police power, however, must be reasonable under the due process clause. To satisfy this requirement, the
state must establish that "the interests of the public . . . require
such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly op200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1501 (West 1979); IND. CODE § 16-10-2.1-6.8 (Supp.
1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-23 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.03(22)(D) (West 1979).
For a proposed model statute, see Comment, supra note 4, at 1390.
201. See supra text accompanying note 154.
202. See supra note 48.
203. Once the legislature determines that steps are necessary for the general welfare,
courts will pay considerable deference to that decision. As the United States Supreme Court
observed in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), "[tlhe role of the judiciary in determining whether [legislative] power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely
narrow one."
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Several commentators also have noted

that "only the most unusual and totally arbitrary zoning ordinance
could fail such a test. . . .Thus, any arguable 'police power' action
'205
is likely to be a non-compensable regulation.

One can argue that a state's prohibition of restrictive covenants
excluding the mentally retarded furthers not only the interests of
the mentally retarded, but also the interests of the general public.
If states allow private landowners to prevent the establishment of
group homes in residential neighborhoods, the result could be a
concentration of such homes in certain types of areas or in one
particular area. State intervention benefits society, therefore, by
limiting concentrations of group homes, increasing the exposure of
citizens to diverse groups, and lessening the impact on school systems, social agencies, and health facilities. The state thus can assert that the interests of the public require intervention on behalf
of group homes. Moreover, these state interests probably are sufficient to withstand a challenge by property owners because the
courts have recognized a wide variety of legitimate governmental
interests that affect the quality of life. As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive....
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care2 06
fully patrolled.

To ensure that the state's prohibition of covenants that exclude
204. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894); see generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 153, at 443-44; W. STOEBUCK, supra note 108, at 168.
205. J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 153, at 444.
206. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). See also Young v. American Mini Thea-

tres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinance restricting location of adult movie theaters); Cordova v. City of Tucson, 16 Ariz. App. 447, 494 P.2d 52 (1972) (preservation of
historic property is a public use); City of Miami Beach v. Broida, 362 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App.
1978) (civic center is a public use); Flaccomio v. Mayor of Baltimore, 194 Md. 275, 71 A.2d
12 (1950) (expansion of an historical site and museum was a public use); Elbert v. Village of
N. Hills, 262 A.D. 470, 28 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (upholding zoning ordinance designed to protect "appearance and environment"), reu'd on other grounds, 262 A.D. 856, 28 N.Y.S.2d 172
(1941); City of Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash. 2d 130, 437 P.2d 171 (1968) (a marina is
a public use).
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the mentally retarded is not "unduly oppressive," however, the legislature should incorporate into the statute limitations on the size,
number, and outward appearance of group homes.10 7 Usually, the
state can impose these limitations on group homes through its licensing provisions. °8
B. Does the Statute Constitute a Taking?
If a court concludes that the state's regulation of restrictive covenants is a valid exercise of its police power, the court then must
consider whether the statute amounts to a taking of private property requiring compensation. Although a "non-acquisitive regulation" can result in the taking of property, 0e not every regulation
that diminishes property values constitutes a taking. In fact, a
statute can diminish substantially the value of property without
constituting a taking.2 10
A number of courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have addressed the extent to which a state can regulate land without paying compensation.2 1 These decisions provide little guidance
in determining whether a taking has occurred, 212 however, because
the courts frequently fail to distinguish between whether a taking
has occurred and whether the statute constitutes a valid exercise of
the state's police power. As one commentator has noted, "[i]n
practice we will find the courts tending to blend the due-processunreasonableness limitation with the taking limitation. 2' 3 Conse-

207. Some state statutes already impose such limitations on group homes. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3e (West Supp. 1983-1984) (zoning statute limits group homes in single-family residential areas to six residents and two staff members).
208. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-467 (Supp. 1983); MICH. CozuP. LAWs ANN.
§ 722.115 (West Supp. 1983-1984); VA. CODE §§ 63.1-196 to -202 (1980).
209. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 153, at 440. Governmental action

that affirmatively takes property or simply prohibits a particular use of the property, such
as forbidding buildings above a certain height in order to preserve a view, makes no difference with regard to whether a taking has occurred because either action can result in a
taking. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAv. L. Rzv. 1165, 1186-87 (1967).
210. Michelman, supra note 209, at 1190-93.
211. See generally J. NOWAK,R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 153, at 443.
212. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 108, at 169.

213. Id. Stoebuck cites the two-part test discussed previously, see supra text accompanying note 204, as the test for determining whether the state statute constitutes a valid exercise of the police power, whereas Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, cite the test as the basis for
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quently, one encounters difficulty in attempting to discern legislative action that constitutes a taking.2 1 The regulation envisioned
in statutes that would allow group homes in residential neighborhoods, however, falls well below the degree of governmental intrusion found in zoning ordinances approved by the Supreme Court.
The prohibition against excluding the mentally retarded from a
home with an outward appearance congruent with the rest of the
neighborhood and an inward structure resembling the typical nuclear family appears considerably less objectionable, for example,
than a zoning ordinance which created a $740,000 decrease in the
value of a particular piece of land.21 5
Consideration of the factors that the courts use in determining
whether compensation is required offers further support for the
position that this type of statute does not constitute a taking.
Courts consider four primary factors in determining whether to
award compensation:21 6 whether the property has been physically
used or occupied; the degree of harm caused; whether the gain outweighs the loss; and whether any loss has occurred other than a
restriction of freedom.21 17 Applying only the first of these four factors, a court could conclude that a statute prohibiting the exclusion of the mentally retarded does constitute a taking. Arguably,
through the enactment of such a statute, the state has acquired a
property interest to the extent that the adjoining land owners no
longer enjoy the same benefit that they had before the governmental action. The fact that the government has acquired a servitude,
rather than a more substantial property interest such as an easement, does not mean that any less of a taking of property has occurred. As one commentator has noted, the taking that occurs in
either situation is essentially the same:

determining whether a taking has occurred. See J.

NOWAK,

R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra

note 153, at 443-44.
214. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 108, at 170; Michelman, supra note 209, at 1169-70.

215. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
216. Professor Michelman was the first to identify these four factors. Michelman, supra
note 209, at 1183-84.
217. Despite Michelman's criticism of these four factors, courts continue to rely on them.
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (factors for a
court to consider in determining whether a taking has occurred include whether the property has been invaded physically, the economic impact on the property, and whether the
gain outweighs the loss).
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it appears equally true of the easement and servitude cases that
the condemnee is deprived of the protection of law for a claim
which has conventionally been regarded as a twig in his fee simple bundle-in the easement case, 211
a 8right to exclude, and in the
servitude case, a liberty to exploit.
In contrast to this first factor, however, the remaining three factors indicate that a statute prohibiting the exclusion of the mentally retarded would not constitute a taking. As discussed previously, 219 the placement of a group home for the mentally retarded
in a neighborhood does not produce any substantial decrease in the
value of the adjoining property. A statute which promotes the development of group homes, therefore, would not result in any substantial harm or loss. Moreover, even though subject to debate, the
gain realized by the public from the prohibition of restrictive covenants that exclude the mentally handicapped outweighs the loss
suffered by the adjoining land owners. Although this conclusion is
difficult to support because of the inherent problem in attempting
to quantify relative benefits, the balance clearly favors the development of group homes which have little impact on surrounding
property values, rather than the warehousing of large numbers of
individuals in harmful environments.2 2 °
C. Retroactivity
Of the four states that have enacted statutes prohibiting the exclusion of the mentally retarded, only California 221 limits the applicability of the statute to prospective agreements. Whether the
other states have the power to apply their statutes to restrictive
covenants retroactively raises serious constitutional questions.
1. Contract Clause
The contract clause of the United States Constitution provides
that "No State shall. . . pass any. . .Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ..
222 The extent to which the retroactive ap218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Michelman, supra note 209, at 1187 n.45.
See supra text accompanying notes 114-22.
Id.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1501 (West 1979).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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plication of a statute would violate this provision is not clear. In
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,22s the United
States Supreme Court upheld a state statute authorizing courts to
extend the time in which mortgagors could redeem their property
following a foreclosure sale. The Court held that "[n]ot only are
existing laws read into contracts . ..,but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts . ..
Among "the 'rules' that may be read into every
contract at its inception is the rule that all other rules are subject
to change if and when 2 the
legislature reasonably concludes that
25
such change is needed.
The constitutional limitations that remain based on the contract
clause, therefore, are uncertain. One commentator has suggested,
however, that "[i]n all likelihood, the content [of the contract
clause] . . .is essentially coextensive with the reach of substantive
due process and equal protection; it draws centrally on an evolving
principle that there exist limits on the degree to which government
can sacrifice some individuals to serve the ends of others. ' 226 The
previous discussion on eminent domain considered the extent to
which a state can regulate land use without unduly sacrificing the
property rights of some individuals. 2
2. Due Process And Retroactivity
The due process clause of the United States Constitution also
limits the retroactive application of statutes. To overcome a due
process challenge, the state must establish that it provided reasonable notice before applying the statute retroactively or that the
retroactive application of the statute reasonably conformed with
the public's general expectations. 22 The state is aided in this task
by the considerable judicial deference to the state's determination
of reasonableness. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,229 for
example, the United States Supreme Court displayed considerable
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Id. at 435.
L. TRME, supra note 125, at 468.
Id. at 469; see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 153, at 426-28.
See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 153, at 432.
428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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deference in upholding a statute that required employers to compensate miners for disabilities incurred before the enactment of
the statute. In reaching its holding, the Court asserted that a statute does not violate due process simply because the statute upsets
"settled expectations" and that a court should not "assess the wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme." 23 0 This judicial deference has
led commentators to conclude that "[i]f the legislation does have a
rational relationship to a proper governmental end, the Court will
uphold the retroactive law even though it may impair recognizable
property rights. ' 23 1 Because statutes that prohibit the exclusion of
the mentally retarded are rationally related to the state's legitimate effort at deinstitutionalization, a court should uphold the retroactive application of those statutes even though it may impair
the property rights found in restrictive convenants 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
The judicial trend in the past few years has been to allow the
establishment of group homes in residential neighborhoods and in
single-family residences. The courts, however, often have failed to
delineate the legal basis for allowing this action. Moreover, when
courts have specified the basis for this action, they often have offered inconsistent rationales. The courts, therefore, must analyze
this issue more carefully in the future. Rather than simply voiding
restrictive covenants on public policy grounds as they have done in
the past, the courts must explain their holdings in a more analytical manner.
This Article has attempted to provide an analytical framework
for interpreting private restrictive covenants. In certain instances,
a well-drafted restrictive covenant may give a court no choice but
to compensate the property owner for abrogation of the covenant.
Absent a constitutional or statutory basis for voiding restrictive
covenants that excluded the mentally retarded, a court should con-

230. Id. at 16-19.

231. J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 153, at 433.
232. In the unlikely event that a court found that a statute prohibiting the exclusion of
the mentally retarded was an unconstitutional taking of preexisting contract rights, the
state nevertheless could avoid the retroactivity issue by simply acquiring the property
through eminent domain.
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sider whether public policy requires the court to invalidate the
covenants. If the court finds that public policy does demand such a
result, the public policies should be grounded in legislative pronouncements or well-established judicial precedents.

